solanum-vs-hackint-and-char.../modules/m_challenge.c

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/*
* ircd-ratbox: A slightly useful ircd.
* m_challenge.c: Allows an IRC Operator to securely authenticate.
*
* Copyright (C) 1990 Jarkko Oikarinen and University of Oulu, Co Center
* Copyright (C) 1996-2002 Hybrid Development Team
* Copyright (C) 2002-2005 ircd-ratbox development team
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307
* USA
*/
#include "stdinc.h"
#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO
OpenSSL 3.0 compatibility Edited by @aaronmdjones: - Correct some data types and casts - Minor style fixups (e.g. we put * on the variable name not the type) - librb/src/openssl.c: - Defer call of BIO_free(3ssl) to the end of the conditional block to avoid having calls to it in multiple paths - Check the return value of SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(3ssl) because if it fails then we must use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) to avoid a memory leak This could fail if, for example, the user supplied DSA parameters in the DH parameters file instead. - ircd/newconf.c: - Check whether OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_for_pkey(3ssl) was able to parse the given CHALLANGE public key as a valid RSA public key, and then check whether OSSL_DECODER_from_bio(3ssl) actually loads it successfully - ircd/s_newconf.c: - Use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) instead of OPENSSL_free(3ssl) on EVP_PKEY pointers; this will avoid inadvertent memory leaks if the EVP_PKEY structure contains any dynamically-allocated child members - modules/m_challenge.c: - Unconditionally use EVP(3ssl) to generate the SHA-1 digest of the random challenge; this API has been around for a very long time and is available in all supported versions of OpenSSL - Add lots of error checking to all steps of the process Tested against 1.1.1 and 3.0; both with missing and provided DH parameters (which works as you'd expect; the server will not negotiate a DHE cipher without them), and CHALLENGE, including missing keys or keys of the wrong type (e.g. when you supply an EdDSA key instead of an RSA key). This does break compatibility with OpenSSL 1.1.0 and below, which are now all end-of-life and unsupported anyway. Closes #357
2022-08-13 03:40:48 +00:00
# include <openssl/err.h>
# include <openssl/evp.h>
# include <openssl/pem.h>
# include <openssl/rsa.h>
# include <openssl/sha.h>
#endif
#include "client.h"
#include "ircd.h"
#include "modules.h"
#include "numeric.h"
#include "send.h"
#include "s_conf.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "parse.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "logger.h"
#include "s_user.h"
#include "cache.h"
#include "s_newconf.h"
#define CHALLENGE_WIDTH BUFSIZE - (NICKLEN + HOSTLEN + 12)
#define CHALLENGE_EXPIRES 180 /* 180 seconds should be more than long enough */
#define CHALLENGE_SECRET_LENGTH 128 /* how long our challenge secret should be */
#ifndef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO
static const char challenge_desc[] = "Does nothing as OpenSSL was not enabled.";
/* Maybe this should be an error or something?-davidt */
/* now it is -larne */
static int challenge_load(void)
{
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sendto_realops_snomask(SNO_GENERAL, L_NETWIDE,
"Challenge module not loaded because OpenSSL is not available.");
ilog(L_MAIN, "Challenge module not loaded because OpenSSL is not available.");
return -1;
}
DECLARE_MODULE_AV2(challenge, challenge_load, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, challenge_desc);
#else
static const char challenge_desc[] =
"Provides the challenge-response facility used for becoming an IRC operator";
static void m_challenge(struct MsgBuf *, struct Client *, struct Client *, int, const char **);
/* We have openssl support, so include /CHALLENGE */
struct Message challenge_msgtab = {
"CHALLENGE", 0, 0, 0, 0,
{mg_unreg, {m_challenge, 2}, mg_ignore, mg_ignore, mg_ignore, {m_challenge, 2}}
};
mapi_clist_av1 challenge_clist[] = { &challenge_msgtab, NULL };
DECLARE_MODULE_AV2(challenge, NULL, NULL, challenge_clist, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, challenge_desc);
OpenSSL 3.0 compatibility Edited by @aaronmdjones: - Correct some data types and casts - Minor style fixups (e.g. we put * on the variable name not the type) - librb/src/openssl.c: - Defer call of BIO_free(3ssl) to the end of the conditional block to avoid having calls to it in multiple paths - Check the return value of SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(3ssl) because if it fails then we must use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) to avoid a memory leak This could fail if, for example, the user supplied DSA parameters in the DH parameters file instead. - ircd/newconf.c: - Check whether OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_for_pkey(3ssl) was able to parse the given CHALLANGE public key as a valid RSA public key, and then check whether OSSL_DECODER_from_bio(3ssl) actually loads it successfully - ircd/s_newconf.c: - Use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) instead of OPENSSL_free(3ssl) on EVP_PKEY pointers; this will avoid inadvertent memory leaks if the EVP_PKEY structure contains any dynamically-allocated child members - modules/m_challenge.c: - Unconditionally use EVP(3ssl) to generate the SHA-1 digest of the random challenge; this API has been around for a very long time and is available in all supported versions of OpenSSL - Add lots of error checking to all steps of the process Tested against 1.1.1 and 3.0; both with missing and provided DH parameters (which works as you'd expect; the server will not negotiate a DHE cipher without them), and CHALLENGE, including missing keys or keys of the wrong type (e.g. when you supply an EdDSA key instead of an RSA key). This does break compatibility with OpenSSL 1.1.0 and below, which are now all end-of-life and unsupported anyway. Closes #357
2022-08-13 03:40:48 +00:00
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L)
static bool generate_challenge(char **r_challenge, unsigned char **r_response, EVP_PKEY *key);
#else
static bool generate_challenge(char **r_challenge, unsigned char **r_response, RSA *key);
#endif
static void
cleanup_challenge(struct Client *target_p)
{
if(target_p->localClient == NULL)
return;
rb_free(target_p->localClient->challenge);
rb_free(target_p->user->opername);
target_p->localClient->challenge = NULL;
target_p->user->opername = NULL;
target_p->localClient->chal_time = 0;
}
/*
* m_challenge - generate RSA challenge for wouldbe oper
* parv[1] = operator to challenge for, or +response
*/
static void
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m_challenge(struct MsgBuf *msgbuf_p, struct Client *client_p, struct Client *source_p, int parc, const char *parv[])
{
struct oper_conf *oper_p;
char *challenge = NULL; /* to placate gcc */
char chal_line[CHALLENGE_WIDTH];
unsigned char *b_response;
size_t cnt;
int len = 0;
if (ConfigFileEntry.oper_secure_only && !IsSecureClient(source_p))
{
sendto_one_notice(source_p, ":You must be using a secure connection to /CHALLENGE on this server");
if (ConfigFileEntry.failed_oper_notice)
{
sendto_realops_snomask(SNO_GENERAL, L_NETWIDE,
"Failed CHALLENGE attempt - missing secure connection by %s (%s@%s)",
source_p->name, source_p->username, source_p->host);
}
return;
}
/* if theyre an oper, reprint oper motd and ignore */
if(IsOper(source_p))
{
sendto_one(source_p, form_str(RPL_YOUREOPER), me.name, source_p->name);
send_oper_motd(source_p);
return;
}
if(*parv[1] == '+')
{
/* Ignore it if we aren't expecting this... -A1kmm */
if(!source_p->localClient->challenge)
return;
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if((rb_current_time() - source_p->localClient->chal_time) > CHALLENGE_EXPIRES)
{
sendto_one(source_p, form_str(ERR_PASSWDMISMATCH), me.name, source_p->name);
ilog(L_FOPER, "EXPIRED CHALLENGE (%s) by (%s!%s@%s) (%s)",
source_p->user->opername, source_p->name,
source_p->username, source_p->host, source_p->sockhost);
if(ConfigFileEntry.failed_oper_notice)
sendto_realops_snomask(SNO_GENERAL, L_NETWIDE,
"Expired CHALLENGE attempt by %s (%s@%s)",
source_p->name, source_p->username,
source_p->host);
cleanup_challenge(source_p);
return;
}
parv[1]++;
b_response = rb_base64_decode((const unsigned char *)parv[1], strlen(parv[1]), &len);
if(len != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH ||
memcmp(source_p->localClient->challenge, b_response, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
{
sendto_one(source_p, form_str(ERR_PASSWDMISMATCH), me.name, source_p->name);
ilog(L_FOPER, "FAILED CHALLENGE (%s) by (%s!%s@%s) (%s)",
source_p->user->opername, source_p->name,
source_p->username, source_p->host, source_p->sockhost);
if(ConfigFileEntry.failed_oper_notice)
sendto_realops_snomask(SNO_GENERAL, L_NETWIDE,
"Failed CHALLENGE attempt by %s (%s@%s)",
source_p->name, source_p->username,
source_p->host);
rb_free(b_response);
cleanup_challenge(source_p);
return;
}
rb_free(b_response);
oper_p = find_oper_conf(source_p->username, source_p->orighost,
source_p->sockhost,
source_p->user->opername);
if(oper_p == NULL)
{
sendto_one_numeric(source_p, ERR_NOOPERHOST, form_str(ERR_NOOPERHOST));
ilog(L_FOPER, "FAILED CHALLENGE (%s) by (%s!%s@%s) (%s)",
source_p->user->opername, source_p->name,
source_p->username, source_p->host,
source_p->sockhost);
if(ConfigFileEntry.failed_oper_notice)
sendto_realops_snomask(SNO_GENERAL, L_NETWIDE,
"Failed CHALLENGE attempt - host mismatch by %s (%s@%s)",
source_p->name, source_p->username,
source_p->host);
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cleanup_challenge(source_p);
return;
}
cleanup_challenge(source_p);
oper_up(source_p, oper_p);
ilog(L_OPERED, "CHALLENGE %s by %s!%s@%s (%s)",
source_p->user->opername, source_p->name,
source_p->username, source_p->host, source_p->sockhost);
return;
}
cleanup_challenge(source_p);
oper_p = find_oper_conf(source_p->username, source_p->orighost,
source_p->sockhost, parv[1]);
if(oper_p == NULL)
{
sendto_one_numeric(source_p, ERR_NOOPERHOST, form_str(ERR_NOOPERHOST));
ilog(L_FOPER, "FAILED CHALLENGE (%s) by (%s!%s@%s) (%s)",
parv[1], source_p->name,
source_p->username, source_p->host, source_p->sockhost);
if(ConfigFileEntry.failed_oper_notice)
sendto_realops_snomask(SNO_GENERAL, L_NETWIDE,
"Failed CHALLENGE attempt - user@host mismatch or no operator block for %s by %s (%s@%s)",
parv[1], source_p->name, source_p->username, source_p->host);
return;
}
if(!oper_p->rsa_pubkey)
{
[svn] Backport from early 3.x: -- nenolod 2006/09/27 16:39:14 UTC (20060927-2178) Log: - remove "Processing connection to foobar.net" message Changes: Modified: +0 -3 trunk/src/s_auth.c (File Modified) nenolod 2006/09/27 16:34:26 UTC (20060927-2176) Log: - missed the processing connection one (actually, we can probably nuke this one) Changes: Modified: +1 -2 trunk/src/s_auth.c (File Modified) river 2006/09/27 16:33:05 UTC (20060927-2174) Log: get_client_name = stupid Changes: Modified: +10 -7 trunk/modules/core/m_kill.c (File Modified) nenolod 2006/09/27 16:32:37 UTC (20060927-2172) Log: - remove excessive arguments Changes: Modified: +1 -2 trunk/src/s_conf.c (File Modified) +1 -1 trunk/src/s_user.c (File Modified) nenolod 2006/09/27 16:30:59 UTC (20060927-2170) Log: - use sendto_one_notice() for on-connect notices too. Changes: Modified: +10 -10 trunk/src/s_auth.c (File Modified) nenolod 2006/09/27 16:27:01 UTC (20060927-2168) Log: - use sendto_one_notice() in the core, too. Changes: Modified: +2 -2 trunk/src/chmode.c (File Modified) +8 -15 trunk/src/modules.c (File Modified) +3 -5 trunk/src/s_conf.c (File Modified) +1 -2 trunk/src/s_newconf.c (File Modified) +20 -57 trunk/src/s_user.c (File Modified) river 2006/09/27 16:19:25 UTC (20060927-2166) Log: the KILL command will use get_client_name(, SHOW_IP) instead of target->name, and will show a more useful error for local opers Changes: Modified: +6 -4 trunk/modules/core/m_kill.c (File Modified) nenolod 2006/09/27 16:09:48 UTC (20060927-2164) Log: - fix bugs in sendto_one_notice()/sendto_one_numeric() where a client identifier won't be sent to unregistered clients Changes: Modified: +4 -2 trunk/src/send.c (File Modified) nenolod 2006/09/27 16:05:46 UTC (20060927-2161) Log: - back out r2159 Changes: Modified: +1 -1 trunk/include/client.h (File Modified) nenolod 2006/09/27 16:04:05 UTC (20060927-2159) Log: - get_id(): fall back to "*" if client has no known name Changes: Modified: +1 -1 trunk/include/client.h (File Modified) nenolod 2006/09/27 16:01:29 UTC (20060927-2157) Log: - convert to sendto_one_notice(). Changes: Modified: +2 -3 trunk/unsupported/m_clearchan.c (File Modified) +4 -6 trunk/unsupported/m_force.c (File Modified) nenolod 2006/09/27 15:57:11 UTC (20060927-2155) Log: - use sendto_one_notice() in many places instead of sendto_one(source_p, ":%s NOTICE %s :", ...); Changes: Modified: +10 -25 trunk/extensions/example_module.c (File Modified) +5 -14 trunk/extensions/hurt.c (File Modified) +1 -2 trunk/extensions/m_42.c (File Modified) +7 -12 trunk/extensions/m_mkpasswd.c (File Modified) +1 -2 trunk/extensions/m_ojoin.c (File Modified) +1 -2 trunk/extensions/m_opme.c (File Modified) +3 -3 trunk/extensions/spy_whois_notice.c (File Modified) +3 -3 trunk/extensions/spy_whois_notice_global.c (File Modified) +3 -7 trunk/modules/core/m_die.c (File Modified) +2 -4 trunk/modules/core/m_kill.c (File Modified) +2 -2 trunk/modules/core/m_squit.c (File Modified) +1 -2 trunk/modules/m_challenge.c (File Modified) +11 -15 trunk/modules/m_connect.c (File Modified) +20 -28 trunk/modules/m_dline.c (File Modified) +2 -2 trunk/modules/m_etrace.c (File Modified) +11 -21 trunk/modules/m_gline.c (File Modified) +2 -4 trunk/modules/m_kline.c (File Modified) +1 -2 trunk/modules/m_rehash.c (File Modified) +3 -7 trunk/modules/m_restart.c (File Modified) +31 -45 trunk/modules/m_set.c (File Modified) +2 -4 trunk/modules/m_testmask.c (File Modified) +5 -8 trunk/modules/m_unreject.c (File Modified) +2 -5 trunk/modules/m_xline.c (File Modified) --
2007-01-25 07:23:01 +00:00
sendto_one_notice(source_p, ":I'm sorry, PK authentication is not enabled for your oper{} block.");
return;
}
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if(IsOperConfNeedSSL(oper_p) && !IsSecureClient(source_p))
{
sendto_one_numeric(source_p, ERR_NOOPERHOST, form_str(ERR_NOOPERHOST));
ilog(L_FOPER, "FAILED CHALLENGE (%s) by (%s!%s@%s) (%s) -- requires SSL/TLS",
parv[1], source_p->name, source_p->username, source_p->host,
source_p->sockhost);
if(ConfigFileEntry.failed_oper_notice)
{
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sendto_realops_snomask(SNO_GENERAL, L_NETWIDE,
"Failed CHALLENGE attempt - missing SSL/TLS by %s (%s@%s)",
source_p->name, source_p->username, source_p->host);
}
return;
}
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if (oper_p->certfp != NULL)
{
if (source_p->certfp == NULL || rb_strcasecmp(source_p->certfp, oper_p->certfp))
2010-02-18 05:01:25 +00:00
{
sendto_one_numeric(source_p, ERR_NOOPERHOST, form_str(ERR_NOOPERHOST));
ilog(L_FOPER, "FAILED CHALLENGE (%s) by (%s!%s@%s) (%s) -- client certificate fingerprint mismatch",
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parv[1], source_p->name,
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source_p->username, source_p->host, source_p->sockhost);
if(ConfigFileEntry.failed_oper_notice)
{
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sendto_realops_snomask(SNO_GENERAL, L_NETWIDE,
"Failed CHALLENGE attempt - client certificate fingerprint mismatch by %s (%s@%s)",
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source_p->name, source_p->username, source_p->host);
}
return;
2010-02-18 05:01:25 +00:00
}
}
if(generate_challenge(&challenge, &(source_p->localClient->challenge), oper_p->rsa_pubkey))
{
char *chal = challenge;
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source_p->localClient->chal_time = rb_current_time();
for(;;)
{
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cnt = rb_strlcpy(chal_line, chal, CHALLENGE_WIDTH);
sendto_one(source_p, form_str(RPL_RSACHALLENGE2), me.name, source_p->name, chal_line);
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if(cnt >= CHALLENGE_WIDTH)
chal += CHALLENGE_WIDTH - 1;
else
break;
}
sendto_one(source_p, form_str(RPL_ENDOFRSACHALLENGE2),
me.name, source_p->name);
rb_free(challenge);
source_p->user->opername = rb_strdup(oper_p->name);
}
else
sendto_one_notice(source_p, ":Failed to generate challenge.");
}
static bool
OpenSSL 3.0 compatibility Edited by @aaronmdjones: - Correct some data types and casts - Minor style fixups (e.g. we put * on the variable name not the type) - librb/src/openssl.c: - Defer call of BIO_free(3ssl) to the end of the conditional block to avoid having calls to it in multiple paths - Check the return value of SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(3ssl) because if it fails then we must use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) to avoid a memory leak This could fail if, for example, the user supplied DSA parameters in the DH parameters file instead. - ircd/newconf.c: - Check whether OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_for_pkey(3ssl) was able to parse the given CHALLANGE public key as a valid RSA public key, and then check whether OSSL_DECODER_from_bio(3ssl) actually loads it successfully - ircd/s_newconf.c: - Use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) instead of OPENSSL_free(3ssl) on EVP_PKEY pointers; this will avoid inadvertent memory leaks if the EVP_PKEY structure contains any dynamically-allocated child members - modules/m_challenge.c: - Unconditionally use EVP(3ssl) to generate the SHA-1 digest of the random challenge; this API has been around for a very long time and is available in all supported versions of OpenSSL - Add lots of error checking to all steps of the process Tested against 1.1.1 and 3.0; both with missing and provided DH parameters (which works as you'd expect; the server will not negotiate a DHE cipher without them), and CHALLENGE, including missing keys or keys of the wrong type (e.g. when you supply an EdDSA key instead of an RSA key). This does break compatibility with OpenSSL 1.1.0 and below, which are now all end-of-life and unsupported anyway. Closes #357
2022-08-13 03:40:48 +00:00
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L)
generate_challenge(char **r_challenge, unsigned char **r_response, EVP_PKEY *key)
#else
generate_challenge(char **r_challenge, unsigned char **r_response, RSA *key)
#endif
{
OpenSSL 3.0 compatibility Edited by @aaronmdjones: - Correct some data types and casts - Minor style fixups (e.g. we put * on the variable name not the type) - librb/src/openssl.c: - Defer call of BIO_free(3ssl) to the end of the conditional block to avoid having calls to it in multiple paths - Check the return value of SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(3ssl) because if it fails then we must use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) to avoid a memory leak This could fail if, for example, the user supplied DSA parameters in the DH parameters file instead. - ircd/newconf.c: - Check whether OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_for_pkey(3ssl) was able to parse the given CHALLANGE public key as a valid RSA public key, and then check whether OSSL_DECODER_from_bio(3ssl) actually loads it successfully - ircd/s_newconf.c: - Use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) instead of OPENSSL_free(3ssl) on EVP_PKEY pointers; this will avoid inadvertent memory leaks if the EVP_PKEY structure contains any dynamically-allocated child members - modules/m_challenge.c: - Unconditionally use EVP(3ssl) to generate the SHA-1 digest of the random challenge; this API has been around for a very long time and is available in all supported versions of OpenSSL - Add lots of error checking to all steps of the process Tested against 1.1.1 and 3.0; both with missing and provided DH parameters (which works as you'd expect; the server will not negotiate a DHE cipher without them), and CHALLENGE, including missing keys or keys of the wrong type (e.g. when you supply an EdDSA key instead of an RSA key). This does break compatibility with OpenSSL 1.1.0 and below, which are now all end-of-life and unsupported anyway. Closes #357
2022-08-13 03:40:48 +00:00
unsigned char secret[CHALLENGE_SECRET_LENGTH];
unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
unsigned long e = 0;
unsigned long cnt = 0;
OpenSSL 3.0 compatibility Edited by @aaronmdjones: - Correct some data types and casts - Minor style fixups (e.g. we put * on the variable name not the type) - librb/src/openssl.c: - Defer call of BIO_free(3ssl) to the end of the conditional block to avoid having calls to it in multiple paths - Check the return value of SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(3ssl) because if it fails then we must use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) to avoid a memory leak This could fail if, for example, the user supplied DSA parameters in the DH parameters file instead. - ircd/newconf.c: - Check whether OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_for_pkey(3ssl) was able to parse the given CHALLANGE public key as a valid RSA public key, and then check whether OSSL_DECODER_from_bio(3ssl) actually loads it successfully - ircd/s_newconf.c: - Use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) instead of OPENSSL_free(3ssl) on EVP_PKEY pointers; this will avoid inadvertent memory leaks if the EVP_PKEY structure contains any dynamically-allocated child members - modules/m_challenge.c: - Unconditionally use EVP(3ssl) to generate the SHA-1 digest of the random challenge; this API has been around for a very long time and is available in all supported versions of OpenSSL - Add lots of error checking to all steps of the process Tested against 1.1.1 and 3.0; both with missing and provided DH parameters (which works as you'd expect; the server will not negotiate a DHE cipher without them), and CHALLENGE, including missing keys or keys of the wrong type (e.g. when you supply an EdDSA key instead of an RSA key). This does break compatibility with OpenSSL 1.1.0 and below, which are now all end-of-life and unsupported anyway. Closes #357
2022-08-13 03:40:48 +00:00
bool retval = false;
size_t length;
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L)
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
#endif
OpenSSL 3.0 compatibility Edited by @aaronmdjones: - Correct some data types and casts - Minor style fixups (e.g. we put * on the variable name not the type) - librb/src/openssl.c: - Defer call of BIO_free(3ssl) to the end of the conditional block to avoid having calls to it in multiple paths - Check the return value of SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(3ssl) because if it fails then we must use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) to avoid a memory leak This could fail if, for example, the user supplied DSA parameters in the DH parameters file instead. - ircd/newconf.c: - Check whether OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_for_pkey(3ssl) was able to parse the given CHALLANGE public key as a valid RSA public key, and then check whether OSSL_DECODER_from_bio(3ssl) actually loads it successfully - ircd/s_newconf.c: - Use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) instead of OPENSSL_free(3ssl) on EVP_PKEY pointers; this will avoid inadvertent memory leaks if the EVP_PKEY structure contains any dynamically-allocated child members - modules/m_challenge.c: - Unconditionally use EVP(3ssl) to generate the SHA-1 digest of the random challenge; this API has been around for a very long time and is available in all supported versions of OpenSSL - Add lots of error checking to all steps of the process Tested against 1.1.1 and 3.0; both with missing and provided DH parameters (which works as you'd expect; the server will not negotiate a DHE cipher without them), and CHALLENGE, including missing keys or keys of the wrong type (e.g. when you supply an EdDSA key instead of an RSA key). This does break compatibility with OpenSSL 1.1.0 and below, which are now all end-of-life and unsupported anyway. Closes #357
2022-08-13 03:40:48 +00:00
if(!rb_get_random(secret, sizeof secret))
return false;
if((*r_response = rb_malloc(SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) == NULL)
return false;
OpenSSL 3.0 compatibility Edited by @aaronmdjones: - Correct some data types and casts - Minor style fixups (e.g. we put * on the variable name not the type) - librb/src/openssl.c: - Defer call of BIO_free(3ssl) to the end of the conditional block to avoid having calls to it in multiple paths - Check the return value of SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(3ssl) because if it fails then we must use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) to avoid a memory leak This could fail if, for example, the user supplied DSA parameters in the DH parameters file instead. - ircd/newconf.c: - Check whether OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_for_pkey(3ssl) was able to parse the given CHALLANGE public key as a valid RSA public key, and then check whether OSSL_DECODER_from_bio(3ssl) actually loads it successfully - ircd/s_newconf.c: - Use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) instead of OPENSSL_free(3ssl) on EVP_PKEY pointers; this will avoid inadvertent memory leaks if the EVP_PKEY structure contains any dynamically-allocated child members - modules/m_challenge.c: - Unconditionally use EVP(3ssl) to generate the SHA-1 digest of the random challenge; this API has been around for a very long time and is available in all supported versions of OpenSSL - Add lots of error checking to all steps of the process Tested against 1.1.1 and 3.0; both with missing and provided DH parameters (which works as you'd expect; the server will not negotiate a DHE cipher without them), and CHALLENGE, including missing keys or keys of the wrong type (e.g. when you supply an EdDSA key instead of an RSA key). This does break compatibility with OpenSSL 1.1.0 and below, which are now all end-of-life and unsupported anyway. Closes #357
2022-08-13 03:40:48 +00:00
if((mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto fail;
OpenSSL 3.0 compatibility Edited by @aaronmdjones: - Correct some data types and casts - Minor style fixups (e.g. we put * on the variable name not the type) - librb/src/openssl.c: - Defer call of BIO_free(3ssl) to the end of the conditional block to avoid having calls to it in multiple paths - Check the return value of SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(3ssl) because if it fails then we must use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) to avoid a memory leak This could fail if, for example, the user supplied DSA parameters in the DH parameters file instead. - ircd/newconf.c: - Check whether OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_for_pkey(3ssl) was able to parse the given CHALLANGE public key as a valid RSA public key, and then check whether OSSL_DECODER_from_bio(3ssl) actually loads it successfully - ircd/s_newconf.c: - Use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) instead of OPENSSL_free(3ssl) on EVP_PKEY pointers; this will avoid inadvertent memory leaks if the EVP_PKEY structure contains any dynamically-allocated child members - modules/m_challenge.c: - Unconditionally use EVP(3ssl) to generate the SHA-1 digest of the random challenge; this API has been around for a very long time and is available in all supported versions of OpenSSL - Add lots of error checking to all steps of the process Tested against 1.1.1 and 3.0; both with missing and provided DH parameters (which works as you'd expect; the server will not negotiate a DHE cipher without them), and CHALLENGE, including missing keys or keys of the wrong type (e.g. when you supply an EdDSA key instead of an RSA key). This does break compatibility with OpenSSL 1.1.0 and below, which are now all end-of-life and unsupported anyway. Closes #357
2022-08-13 03:40:48 +00:00
if(EVP_DigestInit(mctx, EVP_sha1()) < 1)
goto fail;
OpenSSL 3.0 compatibility Edited by @aaronmdjones: - Correct some data types and casts - Minor style fixups (e.g. we put * on the variable name not the type) - librb/src/openssl.c: - Defer call of BIO_free(3ssl) to the end of the conditional block to avoid having calls to it in multiple paths - Check the return value of SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(3ssl) because if it fails then we must use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) to avoid a memory leak This could fail if, for example, the user supplied DSA parameters in the DH parameters file instead. - ircd/newconf.c: - Check whether OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_for_pkey(3ssl) was able to parse the given CHALLANGE public key as a valid RSA public key, and then check whether OSSL_DECODER_from_bio(3ssl) actually loads it successfully - ircd/s_newconf.c: - Use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) instead of OPENSSL_free(3ssl) on EVP_PKEY pointers; this will avoid inadvertent memory leaks if the EVP_PKEY structure contains any dynamically-allocated child members - modules/m_challenge.c: - Unconditionally use EVP(3ssl) to generate the SHA-1 digest of the random challenge; this API has been around for a very long time and is available in all supported versions of OpenSSL - Add lots of error checking to all steps of the process Tested against 1.1.1 and 3.0; both with missing and provided DH parameters (which works as you'd expect; the server will not negotiate a DHE cipher without them), and CHALLENGE, including missing keys or keys of the wrong type (e.g. when you supply an EdDSA key instead of an RSA key). This does break compatibility with OpenSSL 1.1.0 and below, which are now all end-of-life and unsupported anyway. Closes #357
2022-08-13 03:40:48 +00:00
if(EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, secret, sizeof secret) < 1)
goto fail;
if(EVP_DigestFinal(mctx, *r_response, NULL) < 1)
goto fail;
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L)
if((length = (size_t) EVP_PKEY_get_size(key)) < 1)
goto fail;
if((tmp = rb_malloc(length)) == NULL)
goto fail;
OpenSSL 3.0 compatibility Edited by @aaronmdjones: - Correct some data types and casts - Minor style fixups (e.g. we put * on the variable name not the type) - librb/src/openssl.c: - Defer call of BIO_free(3ssl) to the end of the conditional block to avoid having calls to it in multiple paths - Check the return value of SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(3ssl) because if it fails then we must use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) to avoid a memory leak This could fail if, for example, the user supplied DSA parameters in the DH parameters file instead. - ircd/newconf.c: - Check whether OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_for_pkey(3ssl) was able to parse the given CHALLANGE public key as a valid RSA public key, and then check whether OSSL_DECODER_from_bio(3ssl) actually loads it successfully - ircd/s_newconf.c: - Use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) instead of OPENSSL_free(3ssl) on EVP_PKEY pointers; this will avoid inadvertent memory leaks if the EVP_PKEY structure contains any dynamically-allocated child members - modules/m_challenge.c: - Unconditionally use EVP(3ssl) to generate the SHA-1 digest of the random challenge; this API has been around for a very long time and is available in all supported versions of OpenSSL - Add lots of error checking to all steps of the process Tested against 1.1.1 and 3.0; both with missing and provided DH parameters (which works as you'd expect; the server will not negotiate a DHE cipher without them), and CHALLENGE, including missing keys or keys of the wrong type (e.g. when you supply an EdDSA key instead of an RSA key). This does break compatibility with OpenSSL 1.1.0 and below, which are now all end-of-life and unsupported anyway. Closes #357
2022-08-13 03:40:48 +00:00
if((pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key, NULL)) == NULL)
goto fail;
if(EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) < 1)
goto fail;
if(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 1)
goto fail;
if(EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, tmp, &length, secret, sizeof secret) < 1)
goto fail;
#else
if((length = (size_t) RSA_size(key)) < 1)
goto fail;
if((tmp = rb_malloc(length)) == NULL)
goto fail;
if(RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof secret, secret, tmp, key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 1)
goto fail;
#endif
if((*r_challenge = (char *) rb_base64_encode(tmp, (int) length)) == NULL)
goto fail;
retval = true;
goto done;
fail:
while ((cnt < 100) && (e = ERR_get_error()))
{
OpenSSL 3.0 compatibility Edited by @aaronmdjones: - Correct some data types and casts - Minor style fixups (e.g. we put * on the variable name not the type) - librb/src/openssl.c: - Defer call of BIO_free(3ssl) to the end of the conditional block to avoid having calls to it in multiple paths - Check the return value of SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(3ssl) because if it fails then we must use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) to avoid a memory leak This could fail if, for example, the user supplied DSA parameters in the DH parameters file instead. - ircd/newconf.c: - Check whether OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_for_pkey(3ssl) was able to parse the given CHALLANGE public key as a valid RSA public key, and then check whether OSSL_DECODER_from_bio(3ssl) actually loads it successfully - ircd/s_newconf.c: - Use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) instead of OPENSSL_free(3ssl) on EVP_PKEY pointers; this will avoid inadvertent memory leaks if the EVP_PKEY structure contains any dynamically-allocated child members - modules/m_challenge.c: - Unconditionally use EVP(3ssl) to generate the SHA-1 digest of the random challenge; this API has been around for a very long time and is available in all supported versions of OpenSSL - Add lots of error checking to all steps of the process Tested against 1.1.1 and 3.0; both with missing and provided DH parameters (which works as you'd expect; the server will not negotiate a DHE cipher without them), and CHALLENGE, including missing keys or keys of the wrong type (e.g. when you supply an EdDSA key instead of an RSA key). This does break compatibility with OpenSSL 1.1.0 and below, which are now all end-of-life and unsupported anyway. Closes #357
2022-08-13 03:40:48 +00:00
ilog(L_MAIN, "OpenSSL Error (CHALLENGE): %s", ERR_error_string(e, 0));
cnt++;
}
OpenSSL 3.0 compatibility Edited by @aaronmdjones: - Correct some data types and casts - Minor style fixups (e.g. we put * on the variable name not the type) - librb/src/openssl.c: - Defer call of BIO_free(3ssl) to the end of the conditional block to avoid having calls to it in multiple paths - Check the return value of SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(3ssl) because if it fails then we must use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) to avoid a memory leak This could fail if, for example, the user supplied DSA parameters in the DH parameters file instead. - ircd/newconf.c: - Check whether OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_for_pkey(3ssl) was able to parse the given CHALLANGE public key as a valid RSA public key, and then check whether OSSL_DECODER_from_bio(3ssl) actually loads it successfully - ircd/s_newconf.c: - Use EVP_PKEY_free(3ssl) instead of OPENSSL_free(3ssl) on EVP_PKEY pointers; this will avoid inadvertent memory leaks if the EVP_PKEY structure contains any dynamically-allocated child members - modules/m_challenge.c: - Unconditionally use EVP(3ssl) to generate the SHA-1 digest of the random challenge; this API has been around for a very long time and is available in all supported versions of OpenSSL - Add lots of error checking to all steps of the process Tested against 1.1.1 and 3.0; both with missing and provided DH parameters (which works as you'd expect; the server will not negotiate a DHE cipher without them), and CHALLENGE, including missing keys or keys of the wrong type (e.g. when you supply an EdDSA key instead of an RSA key). This does break compatibility with OpenSSL 1.1.0 and below, which are now all end-of-life and unsupported anyway. Closes #357
2022-08-13 03:40:48 +00:00
rb_free(*r_response);
*r_response = NULL;
done:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L)
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
#endif
rb_free(tmp);
return retval;
}
#endif /* HAVE_LIBCRYPTO */